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Rethinking Pro-Growth Monetary Policy 
in Africa: Monetarist versus Keynesian Approach
Christian Lambert NGUENA*
Key Messages
The relative positive economic growth experienced by most African countries in the recent
decade has come with insufficient demand stimulation. The concern of poverty at the
forefront of economic policy, the need for inclusive growth and sustainable development,
inter alia, brings forward the inevitable question of the monetary policy responsibility.
Accordingly, the monetarist theory that focuses on price stability inherently neglects the
demand stimulation aspect of economic prosperity. 
Since the mid 1980s, the monetarist school driven by its central aim of fighting inflation
and maintaining credibility in markets and economic agents has been priority for monetary
authorities (especially in Africa). To this effect, while good results in terms of inflation
targeting has been achieved in many African countries; economic growth has sometimes
been low. Hence, in light of the above, using a statistical and theoretical debate method,
the Credible Monetary Policy (CMP)1 paradox is traceable to Africa. Accordingly, with the
promising economic environment in Africa, we recommend the promotion of a monetary
policy oriented toward improving economic growth under the constraint of price stability. 
In light of the above view, there are some note worthy signs such the recent decision by
the two CFA zone central banks to either maintain interest rates at a low level or reduce
it despite tightening measures of monetary policy taken by the European Central Bank
(ECB) earlier in the year. In the same vein, the central bank of South Africa has maintained
its policy of low interest rates with an objective of economic expansion. 
Since, the 2008 financial crisis, the consolidation of the Federal Reserve’s declared final
objective of lowering interest rates and making emergency loans is an eloquent example
to reassure African central banks in the choice of the pro-growth monetary policy option. 
Keywords: Pro growth monetary policy; CMP paradox; Financing enterprises; African
central bank. 
Classification JEL: C23; C33; E52; E58.
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1 | Introduction 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the African Develop-
ment Bank (AfDB) and the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Africa (UNECA) agree on the following: beyond ef-
fective good performance in terms of economic growth,
African economies have a higher growth potential that can en-
able them to become a potential growth pole (UNECA, 2012;
AfDB, 2013). Accordingly, with the involvement of authorities,
this potential can easily be realized with respect to the Key-
nesian theory because total liberalism has been the source of
destabilization and exposure to crises. Thus the aim of un-
leashing the economic potential of Africa can only be achie-
ved with an optimal choice based on contextualization of cy-
clical interventions and taking into account a global
environment characterized mainly by shocks and crises. 
The latest financial and debt crises have led to the launching
of several stimulus plans to rescue the global economy. Whe-
reas Africa was virtually absent from the concert of world re-
covery plans, the majority of sub-regions in the continent
have felt a pinch of the crises. The Economic and Monetary
Community of Central African States (CEMAC) and Economic
and Monetary Community of West African States (WAEMU) felt
(albeit with a slight delay) and continue to feel the heavy effects
of the crises. 
Indeed, the relative disconnection between African banking and
financial systems and the global financial markets (with the ex-
ception of a few countries like South Africa) and stabilization
policies carried-out by monetary authorities since 1990s ban-
king reorganizations, have initially put them out of heavy direct
effects experienced by banks, insurance companies and other
international financial centers in the world. However, African
economies are not spared. Effects of the crisis are already felt
by African countries and probably will continue in the long run. 
Both effects can thus be identified: the effects affecting the fi-
nancial sphere and those affecting the real economy. At the fi-
nancial sphere, the situation of expensive credit experienced
for several years by African economies was exacerbated. In-
deed, there is a paradox between the presence of abundant
bank liquidity and the lack of funding on the one hand and the
excessive cost of credit on the other hand (Ndjanyou, 2001;
Asongu, 2013 a,b,c; Nguena, 2013). This situation by impro-
ving enterprises finance issue tends to negatively impact in-
vestment and therefore economic growth. Furthermore,
Nguena (2013) in a country-level study finds that SMEs have
more chance to get short term credit than long term credit.
Thus these realities in Africa allow us to underline the mone-
tary policy issue in Africa and rethink its implementation and
final objectives which are important for economic growth.
Since the mid-80s, monetary policy is the main policy instru-
ment used by most governments. The need to fight against in-
flation and maintaining credibility with markets and economic
agents have thus led the authorities to give priority to this ins-
trument. Indeed the current neoclassical school focuses on
central bank credibility as an efficiency factor of its monetary
policy from the perspective of achieving its ultimate objective
of price stability. These developments which derive some of
their sources from theoretical analyzes of monetary policy in
terms of credibility2 could be the reason of good results in the
fight against inflation in Africa with however a low economic
growth. Yet as the first section of this paper will show, the CMP
in the fight against inflation should theoretically have a positive
influence on economic growth. 
However in order to unleash the truly economic growth po-
tential of African Countries by making it become effective, mo-
netary policy modeled on monetarist theory can be challenged
in favor of a Keynesian approach. 
In order to verify this affirmation we will go through a theore-
tical and empirical literature review applied to the African
context which first highlights the paradox of monetary policy
in terms of its impact on economic growth and secondly pro-
pose a model of monetary policy for economic growth in
Africa. For a robust and homogeneous analysis we will in the
population of Africa consider the sample of sub-Saharan
Africa countries with a particular focus on CEMAC zone coun-
tries. This analysis and debate is more interesting and justified
since practically, several central banks in Africa have decided
to not only focus on price stability as recommended by the
monetarist school but also to stimulate economic growth by
(for example) lowering interest rates.
2 | Theoretical link between the CMP in terms 
of fight against inflation and economic growth  
The origin of theoretical analysis on the credibility and inde-
pendence is Kydland and Prescott (1977) who highlighted the
problem of time inconsistency and the ambition to solve this
2 In this work, we consider that a monetary policy is credible when it guarantees the continuity of Central Bank action in pursuing its objective of price stability,
and managed to stop monetary funding of budget deficits.
problem especially in the case of monetary policy. Thus they
propose as solution a policy based on a rule.
The benefits of inflation come from the existence in their mo-
del of a non-vertical Phillips curve in the short term. This im-
plies that unanticipated monetary expansion lowers the unem-
ployment rate below the equilibrium rate and increase activity
in real terms. 
The cost of inflation most often described in the literature is
meanwhile scrambling of signals from prices by inflation. In-
deed, higher inflation generally leads to a higher variability of
inflation. This will result in an increase in uncertainty about fu-
ture inflation and a decline in the information contained in re-
lative prices. This increased uncertainty and the scrambling of
relative prices will act negatively on investment and innovation
and, therefore, be unfavorable for factor productivity and
hence economic growth. 
Under the assumptions listed above, contrary to a policy rule,
discretionary policy leads to a higher inflation and well being
costs. While this offers more flexibility for governments, it is
better in theory for a central bank to “tie their hands”. This
commitment would earn the credibility to conduct monetary
policy which is ultimately the best point of view of welfare and
especially GDP growth. Under these conditions, the CMP
would have an impact on economic growth. As an illustration,
a synthetic chart3 of the link between a CMP and economic
growth is presented in figure 1 below.
3 | PARADOX OF CMP IN AFRICA: 
Confrontation of theoretical evolution to 
practical results in the context of application 
"Country, big or small, cannot aspire to a policy of develop-
ment if it does not control monetary arrangements." This
speech of Amin (1973) on monetary barriers to intra-African
trade expansion and development in Africa, highlights the im-
portance of monetary policy on development in the continent.
It implicitly assumes that monetary policy affects real variables
of the economy. However the theory is not unanimous about
the reality of such a link:
The long-term effects of monetary policy:
From a theoretical point of view, the effects of long-term mo-
netary policy were first, according to Solow (1956), studied un-
der the Neo classical growth model. The question was re-
peated with the development of endogenous growth models.
The development of endogenous growth models has helped
to clarify the mechanisms by which money creation and infla-
tion expectations are likely to influence long term economic
growth. Thus, most of these models emphasize the role
played by the household savings rate. A monetary policy that
would positively affect this variable could have a real effect on
the growth rate.
Skeptical theses for a limited relationship between 
Monetary Policy and Economic Growth: 
Very old theses asserting a limited relationship are mainly
shared by monetarists such as Friedman (1968) and by some
prominent economists as Poole. According to them the only
purpose of monetary policy is to ensure price stability, by
preventing any counter-cyclical action which tends to disturb
markets, as uncertainty weighs on action deadline of mone-
tary policy. Authors have taken this view by affirming that ac-
cording to Friedman, monetary policy affects only nominal va-
riables such as nominal interest rates or price levels;
Accordingly, the central bank cannot hope to be effective by
targeting any value of real variable, because the impact on real
variables such as (Gross Domestic Product) GDP or the unem-
ployment rate are transient in nature and very random. 
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3 This chart was deduced from that presented in the article of Mésonnier (2004).
Figure 1 Theoretical link between a CMP 
and economic growth
Source: “Le paradoxe de la crédibilité” 
with author modification.
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In order to resolve this theoretical debate, it is necessary to
make a comparison with African reality instead of a simple im-
plementation of what is fashionable elsewhere.
3-1 Confrontation of the monetary policy theory 
to the application context 
The neoclassical orthodoxy argues in favor of money neu-
trality in the short and long term. This consensus based on
life cycles theory orients the role of the monetary authority
to the absolute pursuit of price stability over the medium and
long term. It assumes that agents maximize their intertem-
poral utility by using the complete knowledge of the complex
economy. Retaining the same analytical framework, the
New Keynesian Economics propose a new synthesis which
consists of introducing the assumption of sticky prices and
wages. Under this review, price rigidity is the cause of dis-
tortions in consumption that cause the economy to not
realize its growth potential (Gali, 2002). For example, New
Keynesian economics, rather than assuming that prices
react to market imbalances, guess they are set optimally, so
as to best serve the interests of firms that are supposed to
fix them, (Woodford, 2003). Only then, an active monetary
policy can correct distortions caused by the rational beha-
vior of firms. This policy is for the Central Bank to follow a
rule that the interest rate is adjusted to respond to the in-
flation differential and the output gap. In this context, money
is not neutral.
In fact, the introduction of nominal rigidities in a model of real
business cycle led to the reformulation of the Phillips curve,
implying a lack of trade-off between inflation and product
(Gali, 2002). So that, if the Central Bank is committed to price
stability, it can achieve stability of output gap. Under this mo-
del, a change in monetary policy affects the product imme-
diately when it is not possible that all prices and wages ad-
just themselves. Thus, the analysis of New Keynesian
Economics shares with the analysis of the New Classical
School the principle of a monetary policy dedicated only to
the stability of general price level consistent with the search
for neutrality. If we follow this analysis, in which prices are
flexible, it is not necessary to conduct an active monetary po-
licy to stabilize the economy. So it is only in a world charac-
terized by fixed prices that we must refer to monetary policy.
This is the case for most African countries. However it is in
the U.S. that this policy is most active; In Africa it is never
used for product and employment stimulation. There is an
obvious contradiction here. Discretionary policies, especially
monetary policies, are needed in the African continent where
the performance in terms of price stability is well established,
providing a possibility that monetary authorities could take
advantage. Inflation is only the price to pay for economic sti-
mulus. Moreover, the strict application of an inadequate rule,
far from guaranteeing neutrality can only generate real dis-
tortions.
3-2 Which real goal for pro-growth monetary 
policy in Africa?
According to Epstein (2005) in the last two decades, there
has been a global sea change in the theory and practice of
central banking policy. Actually and globally the dominant
practice approach to monetary policy consists of the central
bank independence with a focus on inflation fighting (including
adopting formal inflation targeting) and the use of indirect me-
thods of monetary policy like short-term interest rates as op-
posed to direct methods such as credit ceilings. It is with this
framework that price stability and inflation targeting have
been identified as priority objective assigned to the Central
Bank in many African economies. South Africa and Ghana for
example, clearly show the inflation targeting as an explicit
strategy of monetary policy. The contemporary economic
analysis justifies this choice by its importance to the econo-
mic situation in the long run. This is an institutional framework
within which the action of the Central Bank should be pri-
marily oriented to price stability which means low and stable
inflation. The Central Bank exercises control on the economy
through its intervention on the interbank money market, as it
is controlling the quantity or the price but not both variables
simultaneously. They therefore can pursue only a single ob-
jective in the sense of Tinbergen (1954). Price growth is na-
turally selected because of the existence of a strong rela-
tionship between the quantity of money in circulation and the
general price level (Friedman, 1968). In addition, the econo-
mic and social costs of inflation are the main motivations for
the choice of price stability as an objective. More recent
theoretical developments on expectations emphasize the
credibility factor as guarantor of monetary policy effective-
ness. The role and effectiveness of monetary policy is most
often analyzed with reference to monetary rules whose ge-
neral objective is to improve the wellbeing of people through
the stabilization of the economy on its long-run equilibrium.
It is assumed that this equilibrium is in no way affected by mo-
netary policy and depends only on structural variables such
as the natural rate of unemployment. In this perspective, the
price stability objective is understandable. However, is it pos-
sible that this general point of view should be applied in
Africa without contextualization? 
AEB Volume 4, Issue 6, 2013 | Chief Economist Complex |   5
Concerning this issue, by trying to see how central banks can
become agents of development, Epstein (2005) argues that the
neo-liberal and monetarist approach to monetary policy is
highly idiosyncratic in that, as a package, it is dramatically dif-
ferent from the historically dominant theory and practice of cen-
tral banking, not only in the developing world, but notably, in the
now developed countries themselves. According to him more
than the current monetary policy fashion which is to consider
that the only roles central banks can play as agents of deve-
lopment is to create a context of “macroeconomic stability” in-
cluding financial stability through financial regulations, central
banks can do better. In our histories, we can see that for much
of central banking history, many central banks have aspired to
do much more than that, with a number of them even seeing
themselves as “agents of development” in the self-aware mea-
ning of the term. Indeed throughout the early and recent his-
tory of central banking in the U.S., England, Europe, and el-
sewhere, financing governments, managing exchange rates,
and supporting economic sectors by using “direct methods” of
intervention have been among the most important tasks of cen-
tral banking and, in many cases, were among the reasons for
their existence. Western central banks’ (UK, Europe, Japan, US)
monetary policy after the second war were oriented to financing
and managing government debts accumulated during war in
the short term and rebuilding national economies by providing
social need often under government’s direction in the long term.
Central banks utilized a variety of credit allocation techniques
to accomplish their economic growth goals. The neoliberal
monetary policy package, then, is drastically out of step with the
history and dominant practice of central banking throughout
most of its history. At the end of this explanation we realize that
the monetary policies based on monetarist theory have not
been applied in other countries and continent without a contex-
tualization. Focusing on inflation fighting and price stability only
can reduce the growth potential of African economies. 
A low inflation rate also has drawbacks. On the one hand, there
is the risk of plunging the economy into a liquidity trap and a de-
flationary spiral. In this situation, higher real interest rates may
not be unlimited (since nominal rates can not fall below zero)
and the monetary authorities might lose control of the economy.
On the other hand, inflation may be too low and cause a rise
in unemployment because of the downward rigidity of nominal
wages. Adjustments of real wages may be made necessary by
regional or sectoral shocks. However, such adjustments are
probably more difficult when inflation is very low or even zero.
Recent pronouncements of the G3 for the activity under the
context of financial crisis management have put into question
the monetarist orthodoxy regarding the implementation of mo-
netary policy (Goodfriend, 2010). Good monetary policy is cru-
cial to the functioning of the economy: monetary and credit of-
fer vast opportunities to stimulate, stabilize or slow down a mo-
dern economy. With this in mind, these days, we can consider
that the dominant model of monetary policy is no longer adap-
ted to the new characteristics of the economies, as globaliza-
tion has caused the disappearance of inflation risk. In this
sense, a central bank could be a victim of its own success and
face what we can call the paradox of credibility. From a global
supply-demand equilibrium model point of view, there should
be an alternative between demand policy and supply policy for
an optimal equilibrium. In the case of most of African countries
the best result in the fight against inflation should allow them re-
lative possibility to follow this measure by supply policy.
Therefore, to determine the orientation of monetary policy by
tackling only inflation would have two possible consequences.
On one hand, the credibility of the commitment of central
banks to strengthen the fight against inflation and other struc-
tural factors likely to contain inflationary pressures. On the
other hand, while inflation expectations in the long run are bet-
ter anchored around the target of the central banks, an un-
sustainable expansionary phase could be reflected with a de-
lay in an acceleration of inflation (Mésonnier, 2004). On this
view, credible monetary policies that focused exclusively on
price stability may have contributed to the development of ma-
cro-financial imbalances in the late 1990s during the advent of
information and communication technology. However it was
not the case. It would be inappropriate to contemporary ope-
ned economies, interdependent, with high international mobi-
lity of goods, capital and labor. The theory of divine coincidence
which argues that by only stabilizing inflation as an objective,
the monetary authority also stabilizes the economy does not
seem to be applicable in practice (Bordes, 2007). A theoreti-
cal contribution of Blanchard and Gali (2005), shows that this
divine coincidence only come from the fact that, in the models
used, a number of imperfections (for example the real wage ri-
gidities) that exist in the economy are ignored. If they are taken
into account, the divine coincidence disappears. So it would
be better for African Central Banks to target principally eco-
nomic growth under the constraint of a low inflation objective. 
4 | PARADOX OF CMP IN AFRICA:
From mixed empirical results to concrete State
reaction examples  
Bernard (2000) addresses the question of the impact of mo-
netary policy on economic growth, with a purely Keynesian
and panel data approach, without focusing on the credibility
aspect. The results appear disappointing in the case of low-
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level economic and financial development, but very encoura-
ging for countries that have a high income level. Before him,
Kone (2000) had analyzed the relative effectiveness of mone-
tary and fiscal policies through their actions on economic ac-
tivity of the (West African Economic and Monetary Union)
WAEMU member countries in real and nominal terms. In the
short- and long-term, using an error correction model, it high-
lights the real and nominal effects to emphasize the indirect ef-
fect of inflation whose control is a key objective of monetary
policy (unlike Bernard (2000), it performs an empirical inves-
tigation in time series). Ndiaye (2009) evaluates the relative ef-
fectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies in Senegal and
concludes that the relative effectiveness of monetary and fis-
cal policies remains subject to sources of uncertainty related
to unpredictable shocks from outside due to the weakness of
automatic stabilizers. 
By focusing again on the effectiveness of monetary policy in
sub-Saharan Saxegaard (2006) shows that the excess liqui-
dity would have a negative effect, by the weakening of the
transmission mechanisms of economic policy, thereby redu-
cing monetary authorities power to influence demand condi-
tions in the economy. By studying the empirical link between
the CMP and economic growth in Africa in general and in the
CEMAC zone in particular using econometric panel data me-
thodology, Nguena (2009, 2012) found that the CMP in terms
of the fight against inflation has a significant and negative im-
pact on economic growth of states in the sub region and for
Africa countries. 
In sum, the empirical analyzes conducted on this subject
have the advantage to suggest less ambiguous conclusions
than work that attaches directly to quantify the impact of mo-
netary policy on real activity. 
A parallel observation of statistics on inflation and economic
growth evolution in Africa could be rich in learning about
achievements in terms of the growth of monetary policies in
Africa. By observing the figure below (performance corres-
ponding to the two extreme dates (1975 and 2015), implicitly
belonging to two different periods of previously applied Key-
nesian policies and recent policies inspired by monetarist
theories), we find a decrease of inflation (from 11% to 5.53%:
decrease of 5.47%) higher than the increase in economic
growth rate (from 3.80% to 5.41%: increase 1.61%). Moreo-
ver, African economies are different from Western economies
in that they are in majority developing countries synonymous
of higher potential uses of resources however relatively limited
by the monetary policy objective of price stability. Keynesian
policies would be most welcome in this environment. Since the
growth cost is inflation, the flexibility afforded by an environ-
ment of low inflation rate would become useful to monetary
authorities. There are countless examples where such policies
have been used successfully in the past in the Asian countries
including a latest decision to forget policy rules and choice of
intervention policy to save the European and American eco-
nomies from financial and debt crises.
The Federal Reserve with declared final objective which is a
sustainable economic growth may be cited as an example.
Since the beginning of crisis in 2007, the Federal Reserve em-
barked on a massive effort to stimulate growth by lowering in-
terest rates to zero since December 2008 and by financing the
government debt for more than U.S. $ 2 billion. Indeed Bloom-
berg Journal report of November 2011 shows that the Cen-
tral bank has made emergency loans, purchased assets and
other aid totaling more than $ 7.5 billion U.S.
In July 1998 the emphasis of the recession led the Malaysian
authorities to review their economic policies in deciding to opt
for Keynesian anti-cyclical policies (low interest rates, increase
money supply) aimed to reverse the recessionary trend (Bou-
zonville et al., 2006). Malaysia has moved from a liberal-ins-
pired (International Monetary Fund) IMF program to more
Keynesian policies from the summer of 1998 by globally in-
sulating its economy from the instability in the region by im-
posing strict controls on capital to protect its liquidity asset and
continue to fund the economic recovery.
According to UNECA (2012) The two central banks in the Afri-
can Financial Community (CFA) zone, for example maintained
interest rates at a low level in 2011 despite the tightening mea-
sures of monetary policy taken by the European Central Bank
Figure 2 Sub Saharan Africa’s inflation rate 
and economic growth evolution
Source: Author calculation based on World Bank data base (2008)
and International Monetary Fund data base (2010 estimation). 
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early that year. Lastly, first providing a predictable slowdown
in economic activity in the CEMAC zone in 2013 in conjunc-
tion with the decline in oil production and in public investment
and; secondly, noting that growth is mainly driven by the non-
oil sector (agriculture, manufacturing and service industries),
the BEAC (Central Bank of Central African States including 6
African countries: Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Gui-
nea, Chad, and Central African Republic) decided to imple-
ment the recommendation of this paper which is monetary po-
licy with a direct objective of economic growth. Indeed, noting
a slower growth cohabiting with relatively controlled inflationary
pressures and based on a study of various factors influencing
monetary and financial stability in the short term, the BEAC
through its Monetary Policy Committee (CPM) of July 2013 de-
cided to drop by 50 basis points the interest rate (TIAO) ap-
plied to banks from 4% to 3.5%. This recommendation is es-
pecially justified by the fact that the expected maximum
pressure on the price is 2.7%, which is indeed below the com-
munity standard.
Based on similar findings and in order to support economic
activity in the West African Economic and Monetary Union
(WAEMU) sub region, the Monetary Policy Committee (CPM)
of the BCEAO (Central Bank for West African Countries in-
cluding 8 African countries: Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Mali,
Niger, Senegal, Togo, Benin and Burkina Faso) in June 2013
decided to keep interest rates unchanged at their current low
levels. The minimum interest rate for submission to calls for ap-
plication operations for liquidity injection and interest rate of the
marginal lending desk remains fixed respectively between
2.75% and 3.75%. Similarly, the Central Bank of South Africa
has maintained its policy of low interest rates during 2011 for
most part with an objective of economic expansion. These
practical examples of initiatives are to encourage as well as set
an example for other African countries with relative good re-
sults in terms of price stability. 
5 | Conclusion and Economic Policy 
Recommendations 
According to statistics, the CMP in terms of the price stabi-
lity objective paradox is fully verified in Africa. With this rea-
lity, deep institutional changes are necessary. Highlights on
what should be the explicit objective of monetary policy to
play its full part in the development process. While it seems
to be a consensus in developed economies to limit the mis-
sion of monetary policy to price stability, however it appears
difficult for poor countries with low inflation, to not tailor the
policy towards economic development. The success of Afri-
can economies therefore requires the adoption by the cen-
tral bank a mandate that combines the priority objectives of
activity to the price stability; this assuming a comprehensive
reform of the ongoing monetary policy framework. 
Empirical works mentioned above that have shown a nega-
tive impact of price stability on economic growth in Africa
would find an explanation in the fact that the objectives of
price stability and economic growth are opposed according
to Keynesians. Indeed we could establish a policy that would
lead them simultaneously since improving one can drive
down the other. Therefore, instead of continuing to work to-
wards achieving the objective of price stability, we must
make this objective relative in view of the evolution of real va-
riables in the sub-region including economic growth which is
very low. In the same view, the fact that the financial crises
have recently pushed most Northern countries to opt for re-
gulation in response, thus making the independence and cre-
dibility of their central banks relative, should be an example
to African countries. In addition (to strengthening this conclu-
sion), as a result of post-crisis Bretton Woods instructions,
the fiscal instrument was found to have relatively limited
scope for growth in African countries. In light of the above,
we are poised to recommend the promotion of monetary po-
licy oriented primarily towards the improvement of economic
growth in African countries through temporarily Keynesian
cyclical policies. 
As mentioned in the paper, several central banks such as for
example the BEAC, the BCEAO and the Central Bank of
South Africa are currently applying measure based on this re-
commendation by not only focusing on price stability but also
maintaining interest rates at a low level to sustain economic
growth. These practical actions should be encouraged in re-
lation to the results of our analysis and serve as an example
for other central banks which have focused primarily on
price stability with good results in Africa.
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